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Abstract
We study the multi-item mechanism design problem where a monopolist sells n heterogeneous
items to a single buyer. We focus on buy-many mechanisms, a natural class of mechanisms
frequently used in practice. The buy-many property allows the buyer to interact with the
mechanism multiple times instead of once as in the more commonly studied buy-one mechanisms.
This imposes additional incentive constraints and thus restricts the space of mechanisms that
the seller can use.
In this paper, we explore the qualitative differences between buy-one and buy-many mecha-
nisms focusing on two important properties: revenue continuity and menu-size complexity.
Our first main result is that when the value function of the buyer is perturbed multiplicatively
by a factor of 1 ± ǫ, the optimal revenue obtained by buy-many mechanisms only changes by
a factor of 1 ± poly(n, ǫ). In contrast, for buy-one mechanisms, the revenue of the resulting
optimal mechanism after such a perturbation can change arbitrarily.
Our second main result shows that under any distribution of arbitrary valuations, finite
menu size suffices to achieve a (1 − ǫ)-approximation to the optimal buy-many mechanism.
We give tight upper and lower bounds on the number of menu entries as a function of n and
ǫ. On the other hand, such a result fails to hold for buy-one mechanisms as even for two
items and a buyer with either unit-demand or additive valuations, the menu-size complexity of
approximately optimal mechanisms is unbounded.
1 Introduction
Revenue optimal mechanisms for multi-item settings are notorious within mechanism design for ex-
hibiting strange properties. Even in the simplest possible setting where a seller offers two different
items to a single buyer with additive values, the revenue optimal mechanism may offer an infinitely
large menu of options, each of which is a lottery or randomized allocation over the items. Further-
more, no “simple” or “nice” families of mechanisms can achieve any finite approximation in revenue
to the optimal mechanism, even in this two-item additive setting [12]. In effect, it is impossible to
simultaneously achieve simplicity and near optimality for revenue in multi-item settings.
Given this impossibility, in recent work, Chawla et al. [5] advocated studying revenue maximiza-
tion under the so-called “buy-many” constraint. Informally, a mechanism is buy-many if the buyer
is allowed to participate in the mechanism any number of times. For example, a buyer interested in
purchasing a subset of items may purchase the components of this subset individually. Viewing the
mechanism as a function that assigns prices to allocations, the buy-many constraint is essentially
equivalent to a subadditivity constraint over the prices.
Chawla et al. showed that revenue maximization under the buy-many constraint is vastly differ-
ent from unconstrained revenue maximization. In contrast to the aforementioned impossibility of
simple and near optimal mechanisms in the unconstrained setting, the optimal buy-many revenue
is always approximated within a factor of O(log n) by item pricing.1 Here n is the number of items
being sold, and item pricing is the mechanism that assigns a price to every item and lets the buyer
purchase any subset at the sum of the constituent prices.
The buy-many constraint is a natural property that most real-world mechanisms satisfy. All of
the simple classes of mechanisms studied in literature such as item pricings, grand bundle pricing,
two part tariffs, etc. also satisfy this property. As such, buy-many mechanisms are a worthy object
of study. Chawla et al. asked whether buy-many mechanisms exhibit other structural properties
that arbitrary mechanisms do not. In this paper we study two such properties: revenue continuity
and menu size complexity. We now discuss these two properties, their significance, and our results
in detail.
Revenue Continuity. When sellers invest in improving their products and offerings, they gen-
erally expect that consumers will be willing to spend more on the products and revenue will follow
suit. Surprisingly, Hart and Reny [11] showed that this is not necessarily the case when the seller
has multiple products to sell: it is possible to construct a distribution over valuations, such that
when every valuation in the support of the distribution weakly increases, the optimal revenue of
the seller strictly decreases. This phenomenon has come to be known as revenue non-monotonicity.
The same phenomenon can be exhibited also for buy-many mechanisms.2
Given this observation, one may ask: by how much can the revenue decrease if valuations
change by only a tiny bit. Formally, let D be a distribution over valuations, and let D′ be another
distribution obtained by taking each valuation function in the support of D′ and changing each
component of this function multiplicatively by some factor in [1 − ǫ, 1 + ǫ] for some small ǫ > 0.
Can we then show that RevD′ ≥ (1 − ǫ′)RevD where ǫ′ goes to 0 as ǫ goes to 0? We call such a
property revenue continuity.
It turns out that the unconstrained optimal revenue does not exhibit revenue continuity. We
use an example from Psomas et al. [14] to show that for every ǫ > 0, there exist distributions D
and D′ of unit-demand valuations with D′ being an “ǫ-perturbation” of D as described above, such
that RevD =∞ whereas RevD′ <∞.
In sharp contrast to the unconstrained setting, we show that buy-many mechanisms always
satisfy revenue continuity, regardless of the distribution D. When the seller has n items to sell, the
relative loss in revenue, ǫ′, depends polynomially on n and ǫ. On the other hand, we show that a
1Briest et al. [3] previously showed a similar result for unit-demand buyers. Babaioff et al. [2] showed that there
is a revenue gap between unconstrained and buy-many mechanisms even when buyers’ values for different items are
independently distributed.
2Indeed, consider any example with bounded additive valuations for which the unconstrained optimal revenue is
non-monotone, such as the example in [11]. Add a new item to this example, assigning a high value of H to every
buyer type for this additional item, where H exceeds the maximum value that any buyer obtains from any subset
of the original items. Then the optimal buy-many revenue for the new setting is exactly H more than the optimal
unconstrained revenue of the original setting. In particular, for any mechanism for the original setting, by offering
the new item within every possible outcome at a price of H more, the revenue of the mechanism increases by H ; This
new mechanism is buy-many because any two options cost at least 2H , which is more than the value of the buyer
from any allocation. On the other hand, the optimal revenue cannot increase by more than an additive H amount,
because given any mechanism for the new setting, we can obtain one for the old setting by replacing any allocation
of the new item by its equivalent monetary value.
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polynomial dependence on n is necessary even when the buyer is unit-demand.
While revenue continuity is inherently interesting, it also has practical implications. Continuity
implies that revenue estimates established on the basis of market analysis will be robust to errors
in estimating demand. Furthermore, the accuracy of these estimates will improve directly with
reduction in measurement error. From an algorithmic standpoint, revenue continuity allows dis-
cretizing the values to their most significant digits through a sufficiently fine multiplicative grid.
This is possible to do without a significant drop in revenue.
We note that our proposed notion of continuity through multiplicative perturbations differs
from other notions proposed in the literature. It is common to consider additive perturbations as
done in [15, 1, 6]; See also Kothari et al. [13] for a more principled exposition of this approach
to bound the change in revenue in mechanisms. In addition, other notions of distance like total
variation and Prokhorov distance have been considered that are useful when learning distributions
through samples. Continuity results based on these distances typically depend on the range of values
achieved by consumer valuation functions. In contrast, our notion of multiplicative perturbation
is scale invariant and applies to value distributions of arbitrary support. While it is not possible
to guarantee such strong continuity properties in the unconstrained setting even for unit-demand
valuations, in the buy-many setting we show that it holds for arbitrary distributions over general
valuation functions.
Menu Size Complexity. An additional property we consider is the menu-size complexity of buy-
many mechanisms. The menu size of a mechanism, defined as the number of different outcomes
the seller offers to the buyer, has been studied extensively in literature as a measure of complexity
for single-buyer mechanisms (see, e.g., [12, 8, 1, 10]). It has a direct correspondence with the
communication complexity of the interaction protocol between the buyer and the seller.
For unconstrained settings, it is known that even for two items and a buyer who is additive
or unit-demand, the menu-size complexity can be infinite [12]. In fact, the same is true for any
mechanism that achieves a bounded approximation to the optimal revenue. All known positive
results for menu size complexity hold when the valuations are drawn from a product distribution
and approximate mechanisms are considered. For the optimal mechanism in the case of an additive
buyer and two i.i.d. items, the menu-size complexity of the optimal mechanism is still unbounded [7,
10].
For buy-many mechanisms, the menu size complexity corresponds to the concept of “additive
menu size” introduced by Hart and Nisan [12], which corresponds to the number of “basic” options
a buy-many mechanism offers. We show that while the optimal buy-many mechanism might still
have unbounded menu-size complexity, the menu-size required for achieving 1− ǫ approximation to
the optimal revenue is always bounded, even for arbitrary distributions over arbitrary valuations.
Indeed, it always suffices to use a menu of size (n/ǫ)2
O(n)
, i.e. doubly exponential in n. When
one considers only unit-demand valuations, a menu of size (n/ǫ)O(n), i.e. singly exponential in n,
is sufficient. In both cases, we provide matching lower-bounds showing that any mechanism that
achieves o(log n) approximation must have doubly exponential (resp. singly exponential) menu
size. In fact we show something even stronger—describing a mechanism that achieves an o(log n)
approximation in any possible encoding, requires doubly exponential (resp. singly exponential)
number of bits.
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2 Preliminaries
We study the single-buyer optimal mechanism design problem where the seller has n heterogeneous
items to sell to a single buyer. The buyer’s type is a valuation function v : 2[n] → R+0 which
specifies a non-negative value for every possible set of items. We assume the buyer’s valuation
function is always monotone: for any sets of items S ⊆ T ⊆ [n], v(S) ≤ v(T ). We study the
Bayesian setting where the buyer’s valuation function v is drawn from a known distribution D over
valuation functions. The objective of the seller is to maximize the expected revenue.
By the Taxation Principle, any single-buyer mechanism can be described by a menu of possible
outcomes, each of which is a lottery that assigns a price to a randomized allocation. Let Λ denote
the set of lotteries in the menu. Any lottery λ = (x, p) is specified by a randomized allocation x
over sets of items, and a price p charged for the lottery. Denote by xS the probability that set
S ∈ [n] is allocated in allocation x, and we have ‖x‖1 = 1. We will use x(λ) and p(λ) to denote the
allocation and price of lottery λ. The buyer’s value from purchasing menu entry λ is defined by
vλ ≡ v(λ) ≡ ES∼xv(S). Since the valuation function v can also be expressed as a vector of length
2n, we also use x · v to denote the buyer’s value when getting allocation x. We assume that the
buyer has quasi-linear utility, which means the buyer’s utility for purchasing lottery λ = (x, p) is
uv(λ) = v(λ)− p = ES∼λv(S)− p.
The Buy-one Model. We say that a mechanism M defined by a menu of lotteries Λ is “buy-
one”, if the buyer is allowed to purchase only one menu option from Λ. We assume that the buyer is
a utility maximizer that always selects the lottery with the highest utility for his realized valuation
function v, argmaxλ∈Λ uv(λ).
The Buy-many Model. A buy-many mechanismM generated by a set of lotteries Λ is defined
as follows. The buyer can adaptively purchase a (random) sequence of lotteries in Λ, where the
buyer can decide which lottery to purchase next after observing the instantiation of the lotteries
purchased previously. The buyer gets the union of all items allocated in each step in the sequence
of lotteries, and pays the sum of the prices of the lotteries purchased. For any adaptive purchasing
algorithm A, let ΛA = (λA,1, λA,2, · · · ) be the random sequence of lotteries purchased by the buyer.
The utility of the buyer under this adaptive strategy is specified by
uv(ΛA) = ESi∼λA,i [v (∪iSi)]− EA
∑
i
p(λA,i).
Any buy-many mechanism can be equivalently described in the form of a buy-one menu. The
expected outcome of any adaptive purchasing strategy A can be described as a single lottery con-
sisting of the allocation ∪i(Si ∼ λA,i) and the price EA
∑
i p(λA,i). The buy-one menu representing
the mechanism is simply the collection of all possible such lotteries. Observe that a buyer offered
such a menu cannot improve his utility by purchasing more than one menu options. We accordingly
say that the buy-one menu satisfies the buy-many constraint.3
Definition 2.1. A buy-one mechanism M defined by lotteries Λ satisfies the buy-many con-
straint if for every adaptive buying strategy A there exists a cheaper single lottery λ ∈ Λ dominating
3[5] use the term “Sybil-proof” for such buy-one mechanisms.
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Revenue. Define RevD(M) to be the revenue achieved by mechanism M when buyer’s type is
drawn from D. We also use Revv(M) to denote the payment of the buyer of type v in mechanism
M. Let Opt(D) be the maximum revenue obtained by any truthful mechanism when the buyer’s
type is drawn from D. Let BuyManyRev(D) be the optimal revenue obtained by any buy-many
mechanism for a buyer with type drawn from D.
Menu-size Complexity. Themenu-size complexity of a buy-one mechanismM is simply defined
to be the number of options on its menu. Likewise, the menu-size complexity of a buy-many
mechanism is defined to be the number of options on its menu, although the number of different
possible allocations made by the mechanism to buyers with different types can be much more
numerous. For example, by this definition the menu-size complexity of item pricings is n. This
definition of menu-size complexity for buy-many mechanisms is similar to Hart and Nisan’s “additive
menu-size complexity”, where there are multiple “basic menu entries” and the buyer can choose to
purchase any subset of them.
Unit-demand Buyers. Say a buyer is unit-demand over n items, if for any possible instantiation
v of the buyer’s type and any set S of items, v(S) = maxi∈S v({i}). That is, the buyer is interested
in purchasing one item, and his value for any set of items is determined by the best item in the
set. For unit-demand buyers, any allocation x can be represented as x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) where
xi is the probability that item i is getting allocated. Note that sometimes a buyer with general
valuation function can be seen as a buyer that is unit-demand over 2n “meta items”, where each
meta item corresponds to some subset S ⊆ [n] of items.
3 Revenue Continuity
In this section, we study the “revenue-continuity” of buy-many mechanisms. We are interested in
understanding the extent to which the optimal revenue changes if the value distribution is perturbed
slightly. This extent depends, of course, on the manner in which the value distribution is perturbed.
It is known [15, 10, 13, 4]), for example, that when each valuation function in the support of the
distribution gets perturbed additively by some small ǫ > 0, the optimal revenue does not change
too much multiplicatively. However, when the buyer’s values are unbounded, it is natural to ask
what happens if the valuation function is perturbed multiplicatively. Formally, we consider the
following kind of value perturbation.
Definition 3.1. Call a value distribution D′ a (1 ± ǫ)-multiplicative-perturbation of value
distribution D, if there exists a coupling of D and D′ with coupled draws v ∼ D and v′ ∼ D′, such
that (1− ǫ)v(S) ≤ v′(S) ≤ (1 + ǫ)v(S) for every item set S ⊆ [n].
The following surprising result based on an example by [14] shows that for buy-one mechanisms,
perturbing the value distribution multiplicatively may lead to a significant change in revenue. It is
even possible that the optimal revenue is infinite before the perturbation, but finite afterward. Since
the theorem was not explicitly stated in [14], we provide a proof in the appendix for completeness.
4Say an adaptive strategy A is dominated by a lottery λ, if there exists a coupling between a random draw S from
λ and a random union of draws S′ from ΛA, such that S ⊇ S
′.
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Theorem 3.2. There exists a distribution D over additive value functions over 2 items with
Opt(D) =∞, such that for any ǫ > 0, there exists a distribution D′ being a (1± ǫ)-multiplicative-
perturbation of D with Opt(D′) <∞.
The main result of this section is that above discontinuity in revenue for buy-one mechanisms
does not happen for buy-many mechanisms. In particular, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Let D be a distribution over arbitrary valuation functions, and D′ a (1 ± ǫ)-
multiplicative-perturbation of D. Then
BuyManyRev(D′) ≥
(
1−O(ǫ1/6n1/2 log1/6 n)
)
BuyManyRev(D).
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The high-level proof idea of the theorem is as follows. We find the optimal
buy-many mechanism for distribution D and give a discount for every lottery for distribution D′.
For any v ∼ D, it is possible that when perturbed to v′ ∼ D′, the buyer switches to purchasing a
much cheaper lottery. However, we can prove that such value types do not contribute too much to
the optimal revenue achieved by buy-many mechanisms.
We first introduce some notation. For any distribution D and A being a set of valuation
functions, define D|A to be the following value distribution: a draw from D|A can be simulated by
first sampling v ∼ D, then setting v to be zero function if v 6∈ A. LetM∗ be the optimal buy-many
mechanism for D represented as a buy-one menu. For value distribution D′, construct a mechanism
M′ such that for each option (x, p) ∈ M∗, there exists a corresponding lottery (x, (1− ǫ′)p) ∈ M′.
Here ǫ′ = ǫ1/6n1/2 log1/6 n is parameterized by ǫ and n. The new mechanismM′ continues to satisfy
the buy-many constraint since we reduce the prices of all menu options uniformly by a factor of
1− ǫ′, and the price of any adaptive strategy also decreases by a factor of 1− ǫ′.
Now we argue that RevD′(M′) ≥
(
1−O(ǫ1/3n1/2 log1/3 n)
)
RevD(M∗). Let set A denote the
set of support value function v of D such that after being perturbed to v′ ∈ v(1 ± ǫ), the buyer
switches from purchasing (x, p) inM∗ to (x′, (1− ǫ′)p′) inM′, with p′ < (1− ǫ′)p. For each v 6∈ A,
the revenue contributed from buyer of type v in M′ decreases by a factor at most (1− ǫ′)2, which
is close to 1. Thus to show that the optimal revenue of the new distribution does not drop a lot,
it suffices to show that the revenue contributed from buyers with type in A is tiny compared to
RevD(M∗).
Before value perturbation, suppose that a buyer v ∈ A chooses to purchase (x, p) ∈ M∗. Since
the buyer is a utility maximizer and prefers not to purchase (x′, p′) ∈ M∗, we have
v · x− p ≥ v · x′ − p′. (1)
After perturbation, the buyer chooses to purchase (x′, p′(1 − ǫ′)) rather than (x, p(1 − ǫ′)). Since
v is disturbed to some v′ ∈ v(1 ± ǫ), the utility of v′ purchasing lottery (x′, p′(1 − ǫ′)) is at
most (1 + ǫ)v · x′ − p′(1 − ǫ′), while the utility of v′ purchasing lottery (x, p(1 − ǫ′)) is at least
(1− ǫ)v · x− p(1− ǫ′). Thus
(1 + ǫ)v · x′ − p′(1− ǫ′) ≥ (1− ǫ)v · x− p(1− ǫ′). (2)
By (1 + ǫ) ∗ (1) + (2), we have 2ǫv · x ≥ (ǫ+ ǫ′)(p − p′) ≥ ǫ′2p, thus
v([n]) ≥ v · x ≥ ǫ
′2
2ǫ
p. (3)
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Since ǫ
′2
ǫ ≫ 1, (3) implies that in M∗, the buyer purchases a lottery that has price much smaller
than his total value. Intuitively, it’s possible to raise the prices to extract more revenue from such
buyers in A. We will exploit this fact to show that these buyer types cannot contribute much
revenue in M∗.
Consider the following item pricing q, which sets price qi = min(x,p)∈M∗
p
Pr[i∈x] for each item
i ∈ [n]. Without loss of generality we can reorder the items in [n] and assume that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤
qn. The following theorem from [5] shows that there exists a scaled item pricing which obtains a
good fraction of the revenue in M∗ from every buyer v.
Theorem 3.4. (Restatement of Theorem 1.3 and Theorem 3.2 of [5]) There exists a distribution
over scaling factor α ∈ [ 12n , 1], such that for any valuation v, Eα[Revv(αq)] ≥ 12 log 2nRevv(M∗).
Henceforth, we will focus on a buyer in A with value v, and let p(v) be the price of the menu
option bought by this buyer in mechanism M∗. Let yi(v) denote the probability over the scaling
factor α in the random pricing αq, that buyer purchases a set of items S with i ∈ S being the
highest-priced item. Let Aj ⊆ A be the following set of buyer types: v ∈ Aj if j ∈ [n] is the
largest index such that yj(v) > 0, and qj >
√
nǫ′2
2ǫ log 2np(v). Let A
′
j ⊆ A be the following set of
buyer types: v ∈ A′j if j is the largest index such that yj(v) > 0, while qj ≤
√
nǫ′2
2ǫ log 2np(2). Then
A =
⋃
j∈[n](Aj ∪A′j).
On one hand, for any v ∈ Aj , yj(v) > 0 implies that there exists some α′ ∈ [ 12n , 1] such that
under item pricing α′q, buyer with type v purchases item j. Therefore v({j}) ≥ α′qj ≥ 12nqj.
Consider the following mechanismMj that only sells item j with deterministic price 12nqj. For any
v ∈ Aj , since the buyer can afford to purchase this item in Mj, such mechanism can get revenue
1
2nqj >
√
ǫ′2
8ǫn log 2np(v) from such buyer. Therefore
BuyManyRev(D|Aj ) ≥ RevD|Aj (Mj) ≥
√
ǫ′2
8ǫn log 2n
RevD|Aj (M
∗),
thus
RevD|Aj (M
∗) ≤
√
8ǫn log 2n
ǫ′2
BuyManyRev(D|Aj ) ≤
√
8ǫn log 2n
ǫ′2
BuyManyRev(D). (4)
On the other hand, for any v ∈ A′j , notice that j is the most expensive item purchased by v
under random item pricing αq for any α ∈ [1/2n, 1]. Thus Eα[Revv(αq)] ≤ qj. By Theorem 3.4,
1
2 log 2n
p(v) =
1
2 log 2n
Revv(M∗) ≤ Eα[Revv(αq)] ≤ qj, (5)
Therefore
v([n]) ≥ ǫ
′2
2ǫ
p(v) ≥ ǫ
′2
2ǫ
·
√
2ǫ log 2n
nǫ′2
qj ≥ ǫ
′2
2ǫ
·
√
2ǫ log 2n
nǫ′2
· 1
2 log 2n
p(v) =
√
ǫ′2
8ǫn log 2n
p. (6)
Here the first inequality is by (3); the second inequality is by the definition of A′j; the third
inequality is by (5). Consider the following mechanism M′j that sells grand bundle {1, 2, · · · , n}
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with deterministic price ǫ
′2
2ǫ ·
√
2ǫ log 2n
nǫ′2
qj . For any v ∈ A′j, by (6) the buyer can afford to purchase the
bundle in M′j , thus such mechanism can get revenue ǫ
′2
2ǫ ·
√
2ǫ log 2n
nǫ′2
qj ≥
√
ǫ′2
8ǫn log 2np(v). Therefore
BuyManyRev(D|A′j ) ≥ RevD|A′j (M
′
j) ≥
√
ǫ′2
8ǫn log 2n
RevD|A′
j
(M∗),
thus
RevD|A′
j
(M∗) ≤
√
8ǫn log 2n
ǫ′2
BuyManyRev(D|A′j ) ≤
√
8ǫn log 2n
ǫ′2
BuyManyRev(D). (7)
From the two cases of Aj and A
′
j, by (4) and (7), we have
RevD|A(M∗) =
∑
j∈[n]
RevD|Aj (M
∗) +
∑
j∈[n]
RevD|A′
j
(M∗)
≤ 2n
√
8ǫn log 2n
ǫ′2
BuyManyRev(D) = 2n
√
8ǫn log 2n
ǫ′2
RevD(M∗).
Thus the revenue contribution from buyer of type v ∈ A is small in M∗. Since for v 6∈ A, the
payment from buyer of type v in M′ decreases by a factor at most (1 − ǫ′)2 compared to his
payment in M∗, thus
RevD′(M′) ≥ RevD′
|A
(M′)
≥ (1− ǫ′2)RevD|A(M∗)
≥ (1− ǫ′2)
(
1− 2n
√
8ǫn log 2n
ǫ′2
)
RevD(M∗)
=
(
1−O(ǫ1/6n1/2 log1/6 n)
)
RevD(M∗)
by ǫ′ = ǫ1/6n1/2 log1/6 n.
We notice that the factor above
(
1−O(ǫ1/6n1/2 log1/6 n)
)
not only depends on ǫ, but also
depends on the number of items n. Such polynomial in n dependency is necessary, due to the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.5. For any ǫ > 0 such that ǫn > 1 and any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists unit-demand value
distribution D over n items and its (1±ǫ)-multiplicative-perturbation D′, such that BuyManyRev(D) ≥
n, while Opt(D′) = 1+δǫ .
Proof. Define c = 1+δδ . For any unit-demand valuation function v, define vi = v({i}) to be the
buyer’s value for item i, ∀i ∈ [n]. For any k ∈ [n], define valuation function v(k) as follows:
v
(k)
k =
1+ǫ
ǫ c
k, while for any j 6= k, v(k)j = 1ǫ ck. Define the value distribution D as follows: with
probability c−k, the buyer has value function v = v(k), ∀k ∈ [n]; v ≡ 0 otherwise. Consider the
following item pricing p, with price pi = c
i for each item i ∈ [n]. For any buyer of type v(k), he
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cannot afford to purchase any item j > k, since the item’s price pj = c
j > ck = v
(k)
j . The utility of
purchasing any item j < k is
vj − pj < vj = 1
ǫ
ck = vk − pk.
Thus under such item pricing, the buyer of type v(k) will purchase item k. Since item pricing
satisfies the buy-many constraint, we have
BuyManyRev(D) ≥ RevD(p) =
n∑
k=1
c−kpk = n.
On the other hand, define D′, the (1±ǫ)-multiplicative-perturbation of D as follows. Each valuation
function v(k) is perturbed to value function v˜(k), where v˜
(k)
j =
1
ǫ c
k for every j ∈ [n]. D′ is defined as
follows: with probability c−k, the buyer has value function v = v˜(k), ∀k ∈ [n]; v ≡ 0 otherwise. In
D′, the buyer always has the same value for each item. For such single-parameter buyer, the optimal
mechanism is grand bundle pricing with a deterministic price. Thus the optimal mechanism for D′
is to post a fixed price 1ǫ c for all of the items, with optimal revenue being
Opt(D′) = c
ǫ
n∑
k=1
c−k <
c
ǫ(c− 1) =
1 + δ
ǫ
.
4 Menu-size complexity
In this section, we study the menu-size complexity of buy-many mechanisms for revenue maximiza-
tion. It is known that for buy-one mechanisms, there exists value distribution D even over additive
valuation functions over two items such that no mechanismM with finite menu-size complexity can
get finite approximation in revenue. In particular, RevD(M) <∞, while Opt(D) =∞. For buy-
many mechanisms, it’s still the case that getting optimal revenue may need a mechanism generated
by infinitely many options. We show this by observing that for D being the value distribution of an
additive buyer over two items, where the buyer’s value for each item is drawn independently from
Beta distribution B(1, 2), the optimal buy-one mechanism satisfies the buy-many constraint with
infinite menu-size complexity, and no buy-many mechanism with finite menu-size can be optimal.
The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 4.1. There exists a distribution D over additive valuation functions over two items, such
that no mechanism M generated by finitely many menu options can obtain the optimal revenue
achieved by buy-many mechanisms.
Suppose that we want a (1 − ǫ)-approximation instead of the exactly optimal revenue. Is the
infinite menu-size still needed? This is true for general buy-one mechanisms [3, 12]. But for
buy-many mechanisms we show that finite menu-size is enough, even for arbitrary distributions
over arbitrary valuation functions. In Section 4.1 we study the problem for a unit-demand buyer.
We first prove that a menu-size of (n/ǫ)O(n) is enough for getting a (1 − ǫ)-approximation for a
unit-demand buyer. Then we observe that such exponential dependency on n is necessary—there
exists a unit-demand value distribution such that no mechanism with a description complexity
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sub-exponential in n can get a o(log n)-approximation in revenue. In Section 4.2 we show that the
above results for a unit-demand buyer can be extended to a general-valued buyer. In particular,
we show that for (1− ǫ)-approximation in revenue, a buy-many mechanism with (n/ǫ)2O(n) options
suffices; while for o(log n)-approximation in revenue, a mechanism with description complexity
doubly-exponential in n is required.
4.1 Menu-size Complexity for Unit-demand Buyers
In this section, we study the menu-size complexity for unit-demand buyers. We start with a positive
result that finite menu-size is enough for (1−ǫ)-approximation in revenue for buy-many mechanisms.
Theorem 4.2. For any distribution D over unit-demand valuation functions, there exists a buy-
many mechanism M generated by O((16n)6nǫ−12n) menu entries, such that RevD(M) ≥ (1 −
ǫ)BuyManyRev(D).
Proof. The proof structure is as follows. First, we show that it is possible to remove all menu entries
where the allocation of some items is small. Then we can discretize the allocation probabilities of
the remaining menu entries while maintaining the revenue. Such a technique of discretization of
allocation probabilities has been used in proving approximation results in menu-size complexity
literature such as [13].
Let M∗ be the optimal buy-one mechanism satisfying buy-many constraint. The following
lemma states that we can ignore all buyers that purchases a menu (x, p) with 0 < xi < δ for some
i ∈ [n] and δ = ǫ3
n3
, losing only O(
√
ǫ) fraction of total revenue.
Lemma 4.3. There exists mechanism M′ and a set A of unit-demand buyer types, such that
RevD|A(M′) ≥ (1−3
√
ǫ)RevD(M∗), and each buyer in A purchases some menu entry (x′, p′) ∈ M′
with x′i = 0 or x
′
i ≥ δ = ǫ
3
n3
for every i ∈ [n].
Proof of Lemma 4.3. For any buyer of value type v, denote by vi = v({i}) his value for item i,
∀i ∈ [n]. For any lottery λ = (x, p), let xi be the allocation of item i in x, ∀i ∈ [n]. For each
item i ∈ [n], define pi to be price of set {i}. Let M′ be the following buy-many mechanism: for
each menu entry (x, p) ∈ M∗, there is a menu entry (x, (1 − √ǫ)p) in M′, if xi = 0 or xi ≥ δ for
each i ∈ [n]; for every other x, the lottery is removed from the menu of M′. In other words, every
lottery with the allocation for each item being not too tiny gets a price discount of factor 1 −√ǫ
in M′, while other lotteries are removed. We prove that M′ satisfies Lemma 4.3.
To show this, we identify a set of buyer types where the value is much more than the corre-
sponding payment of the buyer inM∗. Let A be the following set of buyers v: For λ = (x, p) being
the menu entry purchased by buyer of type v inM∗,∑i:xi<δ xi(vi−vλ) > ǫp. Our first observation
is that buyer types in this set do not contribute much revenue in the original mechanism. Thus we
can ignore the buyers in this set in the later constructions. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 4.4. RevD|A(M∗) < ǫRevD(M∗).
Then we prove that for any v 6∈ A that buys (x, p) inM∗, it will purchase a lottery (x′, p′) that
is not much cheaper in the new mechanismM′. Let xo be the allocation that sets the allocation of
all items with xi < δ to 0 in x, and scales every coordinate up uniformly such that ‖xo‖1 = 1. Let
λo = (xo, po) be the corresponding lottery of allocation xo in M∗. Define vHλ =
∑
i:xi≥δ xivi to be
the buyer’s value contributed from items with allocation at least δ, vLλ =
∑
i:xi<δ
xivi = vλ− vHλ to
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be the buyer’s value contributed from items with small allocation. We also define xH =
∑
i:xi≥λ xi
and xL =
∑
i:xi<λ
xi to be the total allocation for items with large and small allocation respectively.
Without loss of generality we can assume xH + xL = 1, since otherwise the buyer can purchase
the same lottery (x, p) repeatedly until he gets some item to gain more utility. Then vλo =
vHλ
xH
.
By definition of A, for any v ∈ A, vLλ ≤ xLvλ + ǫp, vHλ ≥ xHvλ − ǫp. In M∗, allocation xo can be
simulated by repeatedly buying λ = (x, p) until an item with xi > δ appears; and in expectation
we need to purchase 1
xH
copies. Since M∗ satisfies the buy-many constraint, we have po ≤ p
xH
.
Also notice that in M∗, the buyer prefers (x, p) to (x′, p′), thus
x′ · v − p′ ≤ x · v − p ≤ v
H
λ
xH
+
ǫ
xH
p− p (8)
since x · v = vλ ≤ 1xH (vHλ + ǫp). In M′, the buyer prefers (x′, p′(1−
√
ǫ)) to (xo, po(1−√ǫ)). Thus
x′ · v − p′(1−√ǫ) ≥ xo · v − po(1−√ǫ) = v
H
λ
xH
− po(1−√ǫ) ≥ v
H
λ
xH
− (1−√ǫ) p
xH
. (9)
Adding the above two inequalities (8) and (9), we get
√
ǫp′ ≥
(
1 +
√
ǫ− 1− ǫ
xH
)
p >
(
1 +
√
ǫ− 1− ǫ
1− ǫ
)
p > (
√
ǫ− 2ǫ)p
by xH ≥ 1 − nδ = 1 − ǫ3
n2
> 1− ǫ. Thus p′ ≥ (1 − 2√ǫ)p for any v 6∈ A, combining Lemma 4.4 we
have
RevD(M′) ≥ RevD|A(M′) ≥ (1−
√
ǫ)(1− 2√ǫ)RevD|A(M∗)
≥ (1−√ǫ)(1− 2√ǫ)(1− ǫ)RevD(M∗) > (1− 3
√
ǫ)RevD(M∗).
Now we come back to the proof of Theorem 4.2. By Lemma 4.3, we can first find a mechanism
M′ generated by only menus (x, p) with xi ≥ δ = ǫ3n3 , losing only (1−O(
√
ǫ)) of revenue. Now we
construct the following mechanism buy-many M generated by finite number of menus as follows.
Let α =
√
δ. For any menu (x′, p′) inM′, there exists a menu (x′, (1−α)p′) inM, if x′i is a multiple
of δ2 for every item i. In other words, we remove all menu entries in M′ where the allocation of
some item is not a multiple of δ2.
Suppose that for some buyer v, it purchases (x′, p′) in M′, and now purchases (x, p) in M.
Since the buyer is utility-maximizer in M′, we have
x′ · v − p′ ≥ x · v − p. (10)
Suppose that x′′ is the allocation vector that rounds down every dimension of x′ to the closest
multiple of δ2. Let p′′ be the price of allocation x′′ in M′, then p′′ ≤ p′. Since x′i ≥ δ or x′i = 0 for
each i ∈ [n], we have xi ≤ (1+ δ)x′′i for the rounded allocation x′′. Notice that x′ can be simulated
by purchase a copy of x′, then with probability δ purchase another copy of x′, finally remove the
redundant items. Since in M the buyer prefers to purchase (x, p) rather than purchase (1 + δ)
copies of x′′ and observe that p′′ ≤ p′, we have
x · v − p(1− α) ≥ x′ · v − (1 + δ)p′′(1− α) ≥ x′ · v − (1 + δ)(1 − α)p′. (11)
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Summing up the above two inequalities (10) and (11) we get p ≥ (1 + δ − δα )p′. Take α =
√
δ we
know that the payment of each buyer in M decreases by a factor of (1 + δ − δα )(1− α) ≥ 1− 2
√
δ
compared to his payment in M′. Since mechanism M is generated by menus with allocation for
each item being a multiple of δ2, there are at most 1 + 1δ2 possible values for the allocation of each
item, thus (1 + 1
δ2
)n = O(n6nǫ−6n) possible menu entries in total. Combined with Lemma 4.3,
we get a mechanism M generated by at most O(n6nǫ−6n) menu entries with revenue at least
(1 − 3√ǫ)(1 − √δ)BuyManyRev(D) > (1 − 4√ǫ)BuyManyRev(D). Theorem 4.2 follows by
replacing 4
√
ǫ with ǫ.
The exponential dependency over n in the menu-size is tight, due to the following theorem. The
proof of the theorem has the same intrinsic idea of the proof of Theorem 4.4 of [5], but is simpler
and more generalizable.
Theorem 4.5. There exists a distribution D over unit-demand valuation functions over n items,
such that BuyManyRev(D) is a factor of Ω(log n) larger than the revenue of any mechanism that
can be described using o
(
1√
n
2n
1/4
)
number of bits.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. The proof idea is as follows. Any set of mechanisms that can be described
by exponential number of bits contains at most doubly-exponential number of mechanisms. We
construct a distribution D over value distributions, such that for any fixed mechanism, the proba-
bility that the mechanism can get o(log n)-approximation in revenue is doubly-exponentially small
when the value distribution D is drawn from D. Then the theorem is shown by applying union
bound.
The way we construct a distribution D over value distributions is as follows. Each distribution
D ∼ D is defined by a vector t = (t1, · · · , tN ) ∈ [1, poly(n)]N of real numbers and a set of N = 2n1/4
item sets B = {S1, · · · , SN}: each set has size
√
n, and any pairwise intersection of two sets has
size ≤ n1/4. For each set Si, there is a buyer being unit-demand over Si and has value ti for getting
an item. D is constructed by always taking the same set of sets B, and draw each ti ∈ t randomly
from a geometric distribution.
Throughout the proof, we will call any item set of size
√
n a “basic set”. We first construct a
set of N = 2n
1/4
basic sets, such that the pairwise intersection is small. The proof is deferred to
the appendix.
Lemma 4.6. There exists a collection B of N = 2n1/4 sets of size √n, such that any two different
sets S, S′ ∈ B, |S ∩ S′| ≤ n1/4.
Let B = {S1, S2, · · · , SN} be the sets constructed by Lemma 4.6. For any set Si ∈ B and
t ∈ R, let vSi,t denote the following unit-demand valuation function: for any set of items S ⊆ [n],
vSi,t(S) = t if S ∩ Si 6= ∅; otherwise vSi,t(S) = 0. That is, the buyer has value t for accepting any
item in Si. Define H =
1
3n
1/4. For any t = (t1, t2, · · · , tN ) ∈ [1,H]N being a value vector of length
N , define value distribution DB,t to be a uniform distribution over value functions (v1, v2, · · · , vn) =
(vS1,t1 , vS2,t2 , · · · , vSN ,tN ).
Consider the following mechanism MDB,t: for each vi = vSi,ti , there is a corresponding menu
entry (xi, pi) ∈ MDB,t , where xi allocates each item in Si with probability 1√n , and pi = 12ti. On
one hand, each buyer of type vi can afford to purchase lottery (xi, pi) with utility
ti
2 . On the other
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hand, a buyer of type vi purchasing another lottery (xj , pj) will let him get an item in Si with
probability 1
n1/4
, since |Si ∩ Sj| ≤ n1/4. Thus his utility of purchasing (xj , pj) is at most
1
n1/4
ti − pj = 1
n1/4
ti − 1
2
pi ≤ 1
n1/4
· 1
3
n1/4 − 1
2
· 1 < 0,
since ti, tj ∈ [1, 13n1/4]. Notice that for buyer of type vi, the utility of purchasing any collection of
menus is subadditive over the lotteries, since the buyer’s valuation function is subadditive. Thus
for any adaptive strategy that purchases αj copies of lottery (xj , pj) in expectation, ∀j ∈ [ℓ], the
utility of buyer vi is at most the sum of his utility on purchasing αj copies of lottery (xj , pj) for each
j. Since his utility for purchasing any lottery other than (xj, pj) is negative, no adaptive strategy
purchasing lottery other than (xi, pi) can be optimal. Therefore, the optimal strategy for any buyer
of type vi is to purchase one copy of lottery (xi, pi). Then BuyManyRev(DB,t) = 12N
∑N
i=1 ti.
Let Q be arbitrary class of mechanisms with |Q| ≤ 2N/H2 , and set c = 112 logH. It suffices to
show that there exists a value vector t, RevDB,t(M) < 1cBuyManyRev(DB,t), for every M ∈ Q.
Suppose that we generate a random t = (t1, t2, · · · , tN ) ∈ [1,H], where each ti is independently
drawn from the following truncated geometric distribution: Pr[ti = 2
a] = 2
−a
1−H−1 for 1 ≤ a ≤ logH.
Fix a mechanism M ∈ Q. We study the probability that RevDB,t(M) ≥ 1cBuyManyRev(DB,t),
over the randomness of t.
For the fixed mechanism M ∈ Q, define hi to be the payment of a buyer with type vSi,ti in
mechanism M. Thus, to bound the probability that RevDB,t(M) < 1cBuyManyRev(DB,t), we
only need to bound the probability that Prt[
1
N
∑
i hi ≥ 12cN
∑
i ti] = Prt[
∑
i hi ≥ 12c
∑
i ti].
For any set Si ∈ B, define value distribution Di as follows. A draw v ∼ Di can be simulated by
first draw ti according to the truncated geometric distribution: Pr[ti = 2
a] = 2
−a
1−H−1 for 1 ≤ a ≤
logH; then return value function v = vSi,ti . In other words, for buyer type v ∼ Di, v is always
demanding the same set of items, but the value is drawn from some equal-revenue distribution.
Notice that selling any lottery to this buyer is equivalent to sell fractional amounts of items in
Si to a single-parameter buyer. The optimal revenue from this single-parameter buyer from any
mechanism, over the randomness of ti, can be achieved by a pricing the grand bundle of all items
at a deterministic price. Such optimum is obtained by selling the grand bundle at price H, and the
optimal revenue is 1
1−H−1 < 2. Thus hi is a random variable with expectation
Ehi = RevDi(M) < 2.
On the other hand, Eti =
logH
1−H−1 . Thus
Pr
t
[∑
i
hi ≥ 1
2c
∑
i
ti
]
≤ Pr
[∑
i
hi ≥ 1
4c
E
[∑
i
ti
]]
+Pr
[∑
i
ti <
1
2
E
[∑
i
ti
]]
= Pr
[∑
i
hi ≥ N
4c
· logH
1−H−1
]
+ Pr
[∑
i
ti <
N
2
· logH
1−H−1
]
≤ exp

−2
(
N
4c · logH1−H−1 − 2N
)2
NH2

+ exp

−2
(
N
2 · logH1−H−1
)2
NH2


< 2 exp
(
−2N
H2
)
< 2−N/H
2
.
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Here the first line is by union bound. The second line is by Eti =
logH
1−H−1 . The third line is
by Hoeffding’s inequality and observe that 0 ≤ hi, ti ≤ H. The last line is by c = 112 logH.
Then by union bound, since there are only 2N/H
2
mechanisms in Q, there exists t such that no
mechanism in Q can get revenue at least 1cBuyManyRev(DB,t). This proves Theorem 4.5 since
c = 112 logH = Ω(log n), and any mechanism set of size > 2
N/H2 cannot be described by less than
N
H2 =
9√
n
2n
1/4
bits.
4.2 Menu-size Complexity for General-valued Buyers
We know that a buyer with general value distribution can be seen as unit-demand over 2n possible
sets. The proof of Theorem 4.2 completely goes through when the buyer is unit-demand over 2n
sets instead of unit-demand over n items, thus we have the following theorem. While the theorem
is not a direct corollary of Theorem 4.2, the proof is almost identical to the unit-demand case, thus
we skip the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 4.7. For any distribution D over arbitrary valuation functions, there exists a mechanism
M generated by O((16·2n)6·2nǫ−12·2n) menu entries, such that RevD(M) ≥ (1−ǫ)BuyManyRev(D).
The menu-size we get for (1 − ǫ) approximation in revenue is doubly-exponential in n. We
can show that such doubly-exponential menu-size dependency on n is the best possible for (1− ǫ)-
approximation in revenue. We show that getting o(log n)-approximation in revenue may require a
mechanism with description complexity that is doubly-exponential in n, even when the buyer has
XOS valuation functions. This improves the lower bound in [5] exponentially for general-valued
buyer.
Theorem 4.8. There exists a distribution D over XOS valuation functions over n items, such that
BuyManyRev(D) is a factor of Ω(log n) larger than the revenue of any mechanism that can be
described using o
(
1√
n
22
n1/4/4
)
number of bits.
The proof idea is as follows. Similar to the proof for unit-demand case, we notice that the
number of mechanisms that can be described by doubly-exponential number of bits is at most triply-
exponential in n. We construct a distribution D over distributions of XOS value functions, such
that for any fixed mechanism, the probability that the mechanism can get o(log n)-approximation
in revenue is triply-exponentially small when the value distribution D is drawn from D.
The XOS value functions we consider for the buyer are of the form v(S) ∝ maxi |Si ∩ S|, for a
collection of sets Si that have large size |Si| =
√
n but small pairwise intersections |Si ∩Sj | ≤ n1/4.
These valuation functions can be thought of as (approximately) unit-demand over the exponentially-
many bundles of items Si. Based on this observation, we adapt the lower-bound proof for unit-
demand buyers to general-value functions that are approximately unit-demand over bundles of
items. This allows us to strengthen the lower-bound from exponential to doubly-exponential. See
the appendix for the complete proof.
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A Omitted proofs
Theorem 3.2. [14] There exists a distribution D over additive value functions over 2 items with
OptD = ∞, such that for any ǫ > 0, there exists a distribution D′ being a (1 ± ǫ)-multiplicative-
perturbation of D with OptD <∞.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We will use the following three theorems from previous literature. The first
two theorems show that there exists a distribution D over additive value functions, such that for
any v = (v1, v2) ∼ D, 12v1 ≤ v2 ≤ 2v1, and Opt(D) =∞.
Theorem A.1. (Restatement of Proposition 7.1 of [12]) Let (gn)
∞
n=1 be a sequence in [0, 1]
2 such
that
gapn := min
1≤j<n
(gn − gj) · gn > 0
for all n ≥ 1. Then there exists a sequence (tn)∞n=1 of positive real number and a buyer’s value
distribution D such that
1. For any v ∼ D, there exists integer n such that v = tngn;
2. Opt(D)
Brev(D) >
1
2
∑∞
n=1
gapn
‖gn‖1 , and Brev(D) <∞.
Theorem A.2. (Slightly stronger version of Proposition 7.5 of [12]) There exists an infinite se-
quence of points (gn)
∞
n=1 in [0, 1]
2 with ‖gn‖2 ≤ 1 such that gapn = Ω(n−6/7). Furthermore, for any
gn = (gn,1, gn,2) in the sequence,
1
2gn,1 ≤ gn,2 ≤ 2gn,1.
The theorem is slightly stronger than Proposition 7.5 of [12], by adding the constraint 12gn,1 ≤
gn,2 ≤ 2gn,1. This can be proved by modifying the original proof of Proposition 7.5 of [12] as follows.
In the original proof, [12] shows that the sequence of points (gn) composed of a sequence of “shells”,
each containing multiple points, satisfy gapn = Ω(n
−6/7). All points gn in the N -th shell are of
length ‖gn‖2 =
∑
ℓ≤N ℓ
−3/2/
∑
ℓ<∞ ℓ
−3/2, and each shell N contains N3/4 different points in it with
the angle between any two of them being at least Ω(N−3/4). [12] did not specify how to choose
these points in each shell, but we notice that it’s possible to restrict all points gn = (gn,1, gn,2)
chosen to satisfy 12gn,1 ≤ gn,2 ≤ 2gn,1, and still make the angle between any two points in a shell
being Ω(N−3/4). This proves Theorem A.2.
The following theorem from [14] shows that for any value distribution, if each possible value
shifts uniformly by a small square of length δ, the optimal revenue is always upper bounded by
O( 1
δ2
Brev).
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Theorem A.3. (Theorem 4.1 of [14]). For any distribution D, let D′ be the following value
distribution. A draw v′ ∼ D′ can be simulated by first draw v = (v1, v2) ∼ D, then set v′ =
v + (δ1, δ2), where δ1, δ2 are drawn independently from uniform distribution U [0, δmax(v1, v2)].
Then Rev(D′) ≤ π
δ2
Brev(D′).
Apply Theorem A.3 to a distribution D over additive value functions, such that for any v =
(v1, v2) ∼ D, 12v1 ≤ v2 ≤ 2v1, andOpt(D) =∞. The square-shift with δ = 2ǫ under the assumption
that for any v = (v1, v2) ∼ D, 12v1 ≤ v2 ≤ 2v1 can be captured by (1±ǫ)-multiplicative-perturbation.
Thus for any ǫ > 0, there exists a distribution D′ being a (1 ± ǫ)-multiplicative-perturbation of D
with Opt(D) <∞.
Theorem 4.1. There exists a distribution D over additive valuation functions over 2 items, such
that no mechanism M generated by finitely many menus can get optimal revenue achieved by buy-
many mechanisms.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let D be the value distribution of an additive buyer over 2 items, where the
buyer’s value for each item is drawn independently from Beta distribution B(1, 2). That is, the
buyer’s value vi for each item i ∈ {1, 2} is drawn from [0, 1] with density f(vi) = 2−2vi. In previous
literature Daskalakis et al. [7] characterized the unique optimal mechanism for this setting with
infinite menu-size as follows. Define x0 = y0 ≈ 0.0618 and p∗ ≈ 0.5535 be constants calculated in
[7]. The value space [0, 1]2 is divided into 4 regions: let A = {(v1, v2) : v1 ∈ [0, x0), v2 ∈ [2−3v14−5v1 , 1]},
B = {(v1, v2) : v2 ∈ [0, y0), v1 ∈ [2−3v24−5v2 , 1]}, W = {(v1, v2) ∈ [x0, 1] × [y0, 1] : v1 + v2 ≥ p∗};
Z = [0, 1]2 \ (A∪B∪W). For buyer type in each region, the allocation and payment in the optimal
mechanism M∗ are defined as follows.
• If (v1, v2) ∈ Z, the buyer gets no items and pays 0.
• If (v1, v2) ∈ A, the buyer gets item 1 with probability 2(4−5v1)2 , item 2 with probability 1, and
pays
15v21−20v1+8
(4−5v1)2 .
• If (v1, v2) ∈ B, the buyer gets item 2 with probability 2(4−5v2)2 , item 1 with probability 1, and
pays
15v22−20v2+8
(4−5v2)2 .
• If (v1, v2) ∈ W, the buyer gets both item 1 and item 2, and pays p∗ ≈ 0.5535.
The following lemma shows that the optimal buy-one mechanism stated above satisfies the buy-
many constraint.
Lemma A.4. The optimal buy-one mechanism M∗ for distribution D satisfies the buy-many con-
straint.
Proof of Lemma A.4. We argue that given the menu inM∗, the optimal adaptive strategy for buyer
of any type is to purchase a single lottery: his corresponding lottery in the buy-one mechanism
M∗. For any buyer with value (v1, v2), if his optimal adaptive strategy only purchases one lottery,
then the lottery must be his allocation in M∗. Otherwise, since any lottery in M∗ allocates one
of the two items deterministically, without loss of generality in his optimal adaptive strategy we
assume the buyer first purchases a lottery (x, p) with x = (1, a) for some a ∈ [0, 1) that allocates
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item 1 surely. If he did not get both items, then purchase lottery (x′, p′) with x′ = (0, 1). Such
adaptive strategy is the only possible optimal strategy that does not purchase a single lottery. In
such adaptive strategy, the buyer always gets both items, with expected payment p + (1 − a)p′.
Notice that in M∗, a < 2
(4−5∗0.0618)2 < 0.147; while p ≥ p′ = 0.5. Thus the expected payment of
this adaptive strategy is at least 0.5 + (1− 0.147) ∗ 0.5 > 0.5535 = p∗, which means that compared
to this strategy, it’s better to purchase both items with price p∗ directly. This means that M∗
satisfies the buy-many constraint.
Back to the proof of Theorem 4.1. By above lemma, for distributionD, we haveBuyManyRev(D) =
Opt(D). By Theorem 2 of [9], any buy-one mechanism with menu-size o(ǫ−1/4) cannot get revenue
Opt(D)− ǫ, thus no buy-one mechanism with finite menu-size complexity can get optimal revenue
for D. Now we argue that any adaptively buy-many mechanism generated by finite number of
lotteries also cannot get optimal revenue.
Consider any mechanism generated by a finite set of lotteries Λ = {λ1, λ2, · · · , λN}. The optimal
adaptive strategy of any buyer has the following form. The buyer starts with no item at hand, and
purchases a lottery λ∅ ∈ Λ. Whenever the buyer has a set of items S ⊆ {1, 2} at hand, he has a
lottery λS ∈ Λ to purchase, which only depends on the set of items he has and is irrelevant with the
purchase history. Since there are only 4 possible states of items (i.e., ∅, {1}, {2} and {1, 2}), there
are only N4 possible optimal adaptive strategies for all of the buyer types. The expected outcome
of each adaptive strategy corresponds to a lottery. Therefore the adaptively buy-many mechanism
generated by Λ corresponds to a buy-one mechanism with at most N4 menu entries. The theorem
is proved since such a buy-one mechanism with finite menu-size cannot be optimal.
Lemma 4.4. For any distribution D, let M∗ be the optimal buy-one mechanism that satisfies the
buy-many constraint. Let A be the following set of buyer types v: for λ = (x, p) being the menu
entry purchased by buyer of type v in M∗, ∑i:xi<δ xi(vi − vλ) > ǫp. Then
RevD|A(M∗) < ǫRevD(M∗).
Proof of Lemma 4.4. For any v ∈ A, if λ = (x, p) is the lottery purchased by the buyer in M∗,
there exists i ∈ [n] such that xi(vi − vλ) > ǫnp and xi < δ. Define Ai to be the set of buyer type v
that purchases λ = (x, p) with xi(vi − vλ) > ǫnp and xi < δ, and assume by way of contradiction
RevD|Ai (M∗) >
1
nǫRevD(M∗). For any v ∈ Ai, since the utility-maximizing buyer purchases
λ = (x, p) in M∗ rather than ({i}, pi), we have
vλ − p ≥ vi − pi.
Thus pi ≥ p + vi − vλ > ǫnxi p > ǫnδp. Since purchasing set {i} can be simulated by repeatedly
purchasing lottery (x, p) until item i appears, which needs to purchase 1xi copies of the menu, we
have pi ≤ pxi . By definition of set Ai, xivi > ǫnp ≥ ǫnxipi, thus vi > ǫnpi. Consider the following
mechanism Mi: only sells item i at price ǫnpi. Then every buyer in Ai can afford to purchase it,
while paying ǫnpi >
ǫ2
n2δ
p = nǫ p. Thus the payment of each buyer in Ai raises by a factor of
n
ǫ .
By assumption RevD|Ai (M∗) >
1
nǫRevD(M∗), we know that such mechanism Mi will achieve
revenue strictly more than 1nǫRevD(M∗) · nǫ = RevD(M∗) from buyers in Ai. SinceMi is an item
pricing mechanism, it satisfies the buy-many constraint. This contradicts the optimality of M∗.
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Thus RevD|Ai (M∗) ≤
1
nǫRevD(M∗), and
RevD|A(M∗) =
∑
i∈[n]
RevD|Ai (M
∗) ≤ ǫRevD(M∗).
Lemma 4.6. There exists a collection B of N = 2n1/4 sets of size √n, such that any two different
sets S, S′ ∈ B, |S ∩ S′| ≤ n1/4.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. For any S of size
√
n, let Ny be the number of item sets S
′ of size
√
n
such that |S ∩ S′| = y, ∀x ≤ n1/4. Since such a set S′ can be determined by first choose y
items in S, then choose n1/2 − y items out of S, thus Ny =
(n1/2
y
)(n−n1/2
n1/2−y
)
. Notice that Ny =
Ny+1 · (n−2n
1/2+y+1)(y+1)
(n1/2−y)2 ≥ Ny+1 · (y + 1) for y ≥ 1. Thus for a random set S′ of size
√
n, the
probability that |S′ ∩ S| > n1/4 is
∑n1/2
y=n1/4+1Nx∑n1/2
x=0 Nx
<
∑n1/2
y=n1/4+1N1
1
y!
N1
<
1
n1/4!
.
Then if we randomly select N = 2n
1/4
sets of size
√
n, by union bound, the probability that there
exists two sets with intersection size > n1/4 is at most N
2
n1/4!
< 1 for large enough n. Thus, there
exists a collections of N sets of size
√
n such that the size of pairwise intersection is at most n1/4.
Theorem 4.8. There exists a distribution D over XOS valuation functions over n items, such that
BuyManyRev(D) is a factor of Ω(log n) larger than the revenue of any mechanism that can be
described using o
(
1√
n
22
n1/4/4
)
number of bits.
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Let’s start with some notations used in this proof. Define N = 2n
1/4
, H =
1
3n
1/4, m =
√
N , ℓ = 2N
1/4
. Throughout the proof, we will call any item set of size
√
n a “basic
set”, and any collection of m =
√
N basic sets a “basic collection”. We first construct a set B of
N = 2n
1/4
basic sets through Lemma 4.6, such that the pairwise intersection is small. Apply the
above lemma to the collection of basic sets B constructed in Lemma 4.6, we can also construct a
set of ℓ = 2N
1/4
basic collections C, such that for any two different basic collections Ci, Cj ∈ C,
|Ci ∩ Cj | ≤ N1/4. For any basic collection C ∈ C and t ∈ R, let vC,t denote the following XOS
valuation function: for any set of items S ⊆ [n], vC,t(S) = t√n maxS′∈C |S ∩ S′|. In other words,
such buyer has value t if he is able to get one of the sets in C, and the value decreases linearly with
respect to the maximum portion he could get from any set in C.
For any t = (t1, · · · , tℓ) ∈ Rℓ being a value vector of length ℓ, and C = (C1, · · · , Cℓ) being
the basic collections we constructed above, define value distribution DC,t to be the uniform distri-
bution over valuation functions (v1, v2, · · · , vℓ) = (vC1,t1 , vC2,t2 , · · · , vCℓ,tℓ). Consider the following
mechanism MDC,t for value distribution DC,t. For each vi = vCi,ti , there is a corresponding menu
entry (xi, pi) ∈ MDC,t , where xi allocates to the buyer each set of items S ∈ Ci with probability
1
m ; the price of such allocation xi is pi =
ti
2 .
On one hand, each buyer of type vi can afford to purchase (xi, pi) with utility
ti
2 . On the other
hand, purchasing other lottery (xj , pj) will let buyer vi get an set S
′ in Ci with probability at most
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1
N1/4
since |Ci ∩ Cj | ≤ N1/4, and in this case his value is ti; otherwise the buyer gets a set S′ not
in Ci, then since |S ∩ S′| ≤ n1/4, the value he gets is at most 1n1/4 ti. Thus the utility of purchasing
any other lottery (xj , pj) is at most
1
N1/4
· ti +
(
1− 1
N1/4
)
· 1
n1/4
ti − pj < 0
since pj =
tj
2 ≥ 12 , and ti ≤ H = 13n1/4. Notice that for buyer with type vi, the utility of
purchasing any collection of menus is subadditive over the lotteries, since the buyer’s valuation
function is subadditive. Thus for any adaptive strategy that purchases αj copies of lottery (xj , pj)
in expectation, ∀j ∈ [ℓ], the utility of buyer vi is at most the sum of his utility on purchasing
αj copies of lottery (xj , pj) for each j. Since his utility for purchasing any other lottery is nega-
tive, thus no adaptive strategy purchasing lottery other than (xi, pi) can be optimal. Therefore,
the optimal strategy for any buyer of type vi is to purchase one copy of lottery (xi, pi). Then
BuyManyRev(DC,t) = 12ℓ
∑ℓ
i=1 ti.
The rest of the proof follows the same flow as the singly-exponential description complexity lower
bound proof for a unit-demand buyer. Let Q be arbitrary class of mechanisms with |Q| ≤ 2ℓ/H2 ,
and set c = 112 logH. It suffices to show that there exists a value vector t, RevDC,t(M) <
1
cBuyManyRev(DC,t), for every M∈ Q.
Suppose that we generate a random t = (t1, t2, · · · , tℓ) ∈ [1,H], where each ti is independently
drawn from the following truncated geometric distribution: Pr[ti = 2
a] = 2
−a
1−H−1 for 1 ≤ a ≤ logH.
Fix a mechanism M ∈ Q. We study the probability that RevDC,t(M) ≥ 1cBuyManyRev(DC,t),
over the randomness of t.
For the fixed mechanism M ∈ Q, define hi to be the payment of a buyer with type vCi,ti in
mechanism M. Thus, to bound the probability that RevDC,t(M) < 1cBuyManyRev(DC,t), we
only need to bound the probability that Prt[
1
ℓ
∑
i hi ≥ 12cℓ
∑
i ti] = Prt[
∑
i hi ≥ 12c
∑
i ti].
For any basic collection Ci, define value distribution Di as follows. A draw v ∼ Di can be
simulated by first draw ti according to the truncated geometric distribution: Pr[ti = 2
a] = 2
−a
1−H−1
for 1 ≤ a ≤ logH; then return value function v = vCi,ti . In other words, for buyer type v ∼ Di, v
is always demanding the same sets, but the value is drawn from some equal-revenue distribution.
Notice that selling any lottery to this buyer is equivalent to sell fractional amounts of sets in
Ci to a single-parameter buyer. The optimal revenue from this single-parameter buyer from any
mechanism, over the randomness of ti, can be achieved by a pricing the grand bundle of all items
at a deterministic price. Such optimum is obtained by selling the grand bundle at price H, and the
optimal revenue is 1
1−H−1 < 2. Thus hi is a random variable with expectation
Ehi = RevDi(M) < 2.
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On the other hand, Eti =
logH
1−H−1 . Thus
Pr
t
[∑
i
hi ≥ 1
2c
∑
i
ti
]
≤ Pr
[∑
i
hi ≥ 1
4c
E
[∑
i
ti
]]
+ Pr
[∑
i
ti <
1
2
E
[∑
i
ti
]]
= Pr
[∑
i
hi ≥ ℓ
4c
· logH
1−H−1
]
+ Pr
[∑
i
ti <
ℓ
2
· logH
1−H−1
]
≤ exp

−2
(
ℓ
4c · logH1−H−1 − 2ℓ
)2
ℓH2

+ exp

−2
(
ℓ
2 · logH1−H−1
)2
ℓH2


< 2 exp
(
− 2ℓ
H2
)
< 2−ℓ/H
2
.
Here the first line is by union bound. The second line is by Eti =
logH
1−H−1 . The third line is
by Hoeffding’s inequality and observe that 0 ≤ hi, ti ≤ H. The last line is by c = 112 logH.
Then by union bound, since there are only 2ℓ/H
2
mechanisms in Q, there exists t such that no
mechanism in Q can get revenue at least 1cBuyManyRev(DC,t). This proves Theorem 4.8 since
c = 112 logH = Ω(log n), and any mechanism set of size > 2
ℓ/H2 cannot be described by less than
ℓ
H2 =
9√
n
22
n1/4/4
bits.
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